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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by plaintiff-appellant, Dennis Gaul, 
from the February 21, 1997, order of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey granting 
summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, AT & T, 
Inc. (AT & T), and dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Gaul v. 
AT & T, 955 F. Supp. 346 (D.N.J. 1997). The district court 
held that plaintiff was not disabled under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. S 12101 et seq., 
because: (1) his depression and anxiety-related disorders 
were not impairments that substantially limited his major 
life activity of working; (2) there was no record of such 
impairment; and (3) plaintiff was not regarded as having 
such impairment. The district court also held that plaintiff 
was neither "disabled" under the ADA nor "handicapped" 
under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
(NJLAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq., because his proposed 
accommodation--transfer to a position where he would not 
be subjected to prolonged and inordinate stress by 
coworkers--was unreasonable as a matter of law. Finally, 
having concluded as a legal matter that plaintiff's proposed 
accommodation was unreasonable, the district court held 
that plaintiff's state law claims for breach of contract, 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and constructive discharge must also fail. We 
affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Gaul began working for AT & T in 1981 as a Technical 
Associate and was promoted to Senior Technical Associate 
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in 1983. He was diagnosed as suffering from depression 
and anxiety-related disorders in March, 1984. Although his 
condition was successfully controlled for more than a year 
with anti-depressant drugs, Gaul suffered a nervous 
breakdown in 1986. He was hospitalized for several weeks 
and was absent from work for approximately three months 
during that year. 
 
Gaul eventually returned to work in early 1987. Once 
again, he received drug treatment, and his condition 
appeared under control. Indeed, by late 1988 or early 1989, 
Gaul received a two-step promotion to Member of Technical 
Staff. In June, 1990, however, Gaul suffered a relapse after 
receiving an unfavorable performance review from his 
manager at that time, Joe Warren, and again went out on 
disability leave. 
 
While out on disability leave, Gaul was contacted by Tang 
Jampathon, a supervisor from AT & T's Cordless Telephone 
Department. Jampathon expressed interest in having Gaul 
work on a project for which Gaul's skills were required. 
Gaul explained to Jampathon that he would be unable to 
work under conditions of prolonged and inordinate stress, 
and Jampathon assured him that the people in the 
department would be very supportive. After receiving this 
assurance, Gaul began seeing Dr. Morris Reby, a board 
certified psychiatrist, about his desire to return to work 
when medically able. Dr. Reby diagnosed Gaul as having 
adjustment disorder with depression, anxiety, and 
obsessive/compulsive personality. Gaul had several more 
visits with Dr. Reby and was soon authorized to return to 
work on a "limited basis." 
 
Gaul returned to work on September 4, 1990, and was 
permitted to work short hours for one week. From 
September 4, 1990, until the time he started to work with 
Donovan Folkes, a coworker, Gaul had no problem with 
stress, except when a dispute arose in August, 1991, 
between two coworkers. However, this situation rapidly 
changed in December, 1991, when he was assigned to work 
with Folkes on Phase II of the "International Project," also 
known as the "Herring Project," the purpose of which was 
to design a cordless telephone for the international market. 
Gaul was responsible for physical design of the base unit of 
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the telephone set, and Folkes was assigned the handset 
portion of the unit. 
 
Gaul claims that almost from the outset, he and Folkes 
had difficulty working together, resulting in a constant 
source of stress for Gaul. Gaul accused Folkes of using 
information from "his" data base on the base unit and of 
not sharing information with him. Gaul also claims that 
Folkes "may have" taken credit for one of Gaul's ideas and 
that it "appeared" that Folkes would not acknowledge 
Gaul's contributions to the team. He also claims that 
Folkes failed to note Gaul's contribution during a March or 
April, 1992 meeting and failed to list Gaul as a "co-author" 
on a tooling estimate. 
 
Gaul claims that he spoke to various people at AT & T 
about his difficulties with Folkes. He first attempted to 
resolve the problems with Folkes himself, but when these 
attempts were unsuccessful, he complained, without avail, 
to Jampathon in February, 1992. Gaul also sought help 
from Paul Newland, team leader on the Herring Project, and 
Patricia Kaufman, an Ombudsperson at AT & T. However, 
neither Newland nor Kaufman provided assistance to Gaul. 
 
In April, 1992, Gaul told Jampathon's replacement, 
Edwin Muth, that the situation with Folkes was causing 
him tremendous stress. Gaul again spoke to Muth in April 
or May, 1992, and advised him that he was still having 
trouble with Folkes. Muth told Gaul that he should take the 
matter up with Steve Bourne, the department head. 
 
Gaul spoke briefly to Bourne about Folkes in May or 
June, 1992, and again in June or July, 1992. Bourne then 
arranged a meeting with both Gaul and Folkes in mid- 
August, 1992. Gaul contends that during this meeting he 
told Bourne he was "stressed out" and suggested that he be 
moved off the project. Shortly thereafter, Gaul allegedly 
asked Bourne that he be transferred to a lower-stress 
position. Specifically, Gaul claims that he told Bourne: 
 
        . . . . "Mr. Bourne, if you don't help me, or if you 
       can't help me at this point, I am going to get very sick, 
       and I'm going to pop." 
 
        Again, I looked him in the eye. I said, "Do you know 
       what I mean by pop?" 
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        And I was trying to get an answer from him. He said, 
       "I don't know what you mean by pop." 
 
        I said, "Well, I am going to have a nervous 
       breakdown, and I wouldn't be able to come back to 
       work." 
 
App. at 492-93. During this meeting, Bourne did not 
respond one way or another to Gaul's transfer request. 
Gaul admits that he never followed up on his transfer 
request. 
 
Approximately two weeks later, on September 11, 1992, 
Gaul went out on disability leave. Since that time, he has 
been out on long-term disability and has been receiving 
payments from AT & T's disability insurance plan and from 
the Social Security Administration. He has also made a 
worker's compensation claim against AT & T, asserting that 
his disability is work-related. Gaul claims that he cannot 
perform his former duties at AT & T, nor, in fact, could he 
work for any employer, unless he is protected from 
prolonged and inordinate stress. 
 
On September 9, 1994, Gaul filed a complaint against 
AT & T, alleging four causes of action. In thefirst count, 
Gaul alleges that he was handicapped within the meaning 
of the NJLAD and that AT & T violated the NJLAD by failing 
to accommodate his alleged handicap. In the second count, 
Gaul alleges that AT & T violated public policy as embodied 
in the ADA by failing to accommodate his disability. In the 
third and fourth counts, respectively, Gaul alleges that 
AT & T breached a contract with him and breached an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
 
AT & T subsequently filed a motion for summary 
judgment. The district court entered an order granting the 
motion on February 21, 1997. The district courtfirst 
determined that Gaul's ADA claim must fail because he was 
not "disabled" within the meaning of the act. More 
specifically, the district court concluded that Gaul's 
depression was not an impairment substantially limiting 
his major life activity of working, that there was no record 
of such impairment, and that there was no evidence AT & T 
regarded Gaul as having such impairment. Next, the 
district court concluded that plaintiff's NJLAD claim must 
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also fail because his request to be transferred away from 
coworkers who subjected him to prolonged and inordinate 
stress was unreasonable as a matter of law.1 Finally, the 
district court determined that Gaul's claims for breach of 
contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and constructive discharge must fail because these 
claims could not be maintained unless Gaul's proposed 
accommodation was reasonable. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
plaintiff's ADA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 
supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367. We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we 
exercise plenary review. Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. 
Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 
1993). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, we look to see if there was a genuine 
issue of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
249-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510-11 (1986). 
 
III. 
 
The primary issue before us is whether Gaul's request to 
be transferred away from individuals causing him 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court rejected AT & T's alternative argument that Gaul's 
NJLAD claim must fail because he did not present any competent expert 
medical evidence that he was handicapped at the time he stopped 
working at AT & T. The court found that, for purposes of the summary 
judgment motion, "the testimony and documentary evidence by 
plaintiff's treating physician, including that by defendant's own 
physicians, [was] sufficient to establish that Gaul does in fact suffer 
from 
stress and depressive disorders." Gaul, 955 F. Supp. at 349. Although 
AT & T continues to press this argument on appeal, we need not reach 
it because we also conclude that Gaul's proposed accommodation was 
unreasonable as a matter of law. See infra. 
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prolonged and inordinate stress was unreasonable as a 
matter of law under the ADA. We conclude that it is. 
 
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 in an effort to prevent 
otherwise qualified individuals from being discriminated 
against in employment based on a disability. See 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630, App. at 347-48 (1997). The ADA provides that 
"[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the disability of such 
individual in regard to job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, 
and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. S 12112(a) (1995). 
The Act defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as 
"an individual with a disability who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the employment position that individual holds 
or desires." Id. S 12111(8). An employer discriminates 
against a qualified individual when it does "not mak[e] 
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or 
mental limitations of the individual unless the [employer] 
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the operation of the business 
of the [employer]." Id. S 12112(b)(5)(A). "Reasonable 
accommodation" means measures such as "job 
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, 
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or 
modification of equipment or devices, . . . and other similar 
accommodations for individuals with disabilities." Id. 
S 12111(9). 
 
A plaintiff presents a prima facie case of discrimination 
under the ADA by demonstrating: (1) he is a disabled 
person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise 
qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with 
or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; 
and (3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment 
decision as a result of discrimination. See Shiring v. 
Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 831 (3d Cir. 1996).2 This matter 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although Shiring interpreted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 
S 794 et seq., it is relevant to our analysis of the ADA because "in 1992 
the Rehabilitation Act was amended to incorporate the standards of 
several sections of the ADA, including the section defining `reasonable 
accommodation.' " Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(citations omitted). 
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turns on the second element, namely, whether Gaul was a 
"qualified individual."3 "[T]he burden is on the employee to 
prove that he is `an otherwise qualified' individual." Id. at 
832 (citing Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 
739-40 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 
A two-part test is used to determine whether someone is 
"a qualified individual with a disability." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, 
App. at 353-54. First, a court must consider whether "the 
individual satisfies the prerequisites for the position, such 
as possessing the appropriate educational background, 
employment experience, skills, licenses, etc." Id. at 353. 
Second, the court must consider "whether or not the 
individual can perform the essential functions of the 
position held or desired, with or without reasonable 
accommodation." Id. "The determination of whether an 
individual with a disability is qualified is made at the time 
of the employment decision." Id. at 353-54; see also 
Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 563 
(7th Cir. 1996). 
 
In the present matter, AT & T does not suggest that Gaul 
lacked the requisite experience, skill, or education for the 
vacancy he sought. Nor does Gaul suggest that he could 
have performed the essential functions of his former job 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. AT & T also argues that plaintiff's ADA claim must fail because he is 
not disabled within the meaning of the act. More specifically, AT & T 
asserts that plaintiff has not shown that his impairment substantially 
limits his major life activity of working because Gaul is not incapable of 
performing either "a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various 
classes" as compared to the average person having comparable training, 
skills, and abilities. Appellee's Br. at 29. AT & T also contends that 
Gaul 
has failed to set forth any evidence that his impairment substantially 
limited any other major life activities (e.g., sleeping, eating, 
thinking). 
Because we conclude below that plaintiff's proposed accommodation is 
unreasonable as a matter of law, we need not reach this alternative 
argument. Nevertheless, we strongly suspect that a plaintiff who is 
unable to work with individuals who cause him "prolonged and 
inordinate stress" cannot be said to be incapable of performing a "class 
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes." Cf. Weiler v. 
Household Finance Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The major 
life activity of working is not `substantially limited' if a plaintiff 
merely 
cannot work under a certain supervisor because of anxiety and stress 
related to his review of her job performance." (citations omitted)). 
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without reasonable accommodation. Indeed, Gaul admits 
that "because his fears of returning to the same stressful 
work environment depressed him further, his anxieties 
grew and were affecting him to the point that Dr. Reby 
found him to be totally disabled." Appellant's Br. at 12. 
Thus, we must consider whether plaintiff has demonstrated 
a genuine issue of material fact regarding his ability to 
perform the essential functions with reasonable 
accommodation. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 362 
(10th Cir. 1995). 
 
Gaul can satisfy this burden if he can make at least a 
facial showing that his proposed accommodation is 
possible. See Shiring, 90 F.3d at 832. More specifically, 
Gaul must "demonstrate that there were vacant, funded 
positions whose essential duties he was capable of 
performing, with or without reasonable accommodation, 
and that these positions were at an equivalent level or 
position as [his former job]." Id. Gaul must also 
demonstrate as part of his facial showing that the costs 
associated with his proposed accommodation "are not 
clearly disproportionate to the benefits that it will produce." 
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. School Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d 
Cir. 1995). The term "costs" includes financial as well as 
administrative burdens on a company. Cf. School Bd. of 
Nassau County, Fla. v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17, 107 
S. Ct. 1123, 1131 n.17 (1987). If Gaul is able to make out 
a prima facie showing, "the defendant then bears the 
burden of proving, as an affirmative defense, that the 
accommodations requested by the plaintiff are 
unreasonable, or would cause an undue hardship on the 
employer." Shiring, 90 F.3d at 831. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Gaul has failed 
to satisfy his burden for three reasons. First, Gaul's 
proposed accommodation would impose a wholly 
impractical obligation on AT & T or any employer. Indeed, 
AT & T could never achieve more than temporary 
compliance because compliance would depend entirely on 
Gaul's stress level at any given moment. This, in turn, 
would depend on an infinite number of variables, few of 
which AT & T controls. Moreover, the term"prolonged and 
inordinate stress" is not only subject to constant change, it 
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is also subject to tremendous abuse. The only certainty for 
AT & T would be its obligation to transfer Gaul to another 
department whenever he becomes "stressed out" by a 
coworker or supervisor. It is difficult to imagine a more 
amorphous "standard" to impose on an employer. 
 
Second, Gaul's proposed accommodation would also 
impose extraordinary administrative burdens on AT &T. In 
order to reduce Gaul's exposure to coworkers who cause 
him prolonged and inordinate stress, AT & T supervisors 
would have to consider, among other things, Gaul's stress 
level whenever assigning projects to workers or teams, 
changing work locations, or planning social events. Such 
considerations would require far too much oversight and 
are simply not required under law. 
 
Third, by asking to be transferred away from individuals 
who cause him prolonged and inordinate stress, Gaul is 
essentially asking this court to establish the conditions of 
his employment, most notably, with whom he will work. 
However, "[n]othing in the ADA allows this shift in 
responsibility." Weiler, 101 F.3d at 526. "Indeed, nothing in 
the law leads us to conclude that in enacting the disability 
acts, Congress intended to interfere with personnel 
decisions within an organizational hierarchy. Congress 
intended simply that disabled persons have the same 
opportunities available to them as are available to 
nondisabled persons." Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank of 
N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 
In sum, Gaul does not meet his burden under Shiring 
because his proposed accommodation was unreasonable as 
a matter of law. Therefore, Gaul is not a "qualified 
individual" under the ADA, and AT & T's alleged failure to 
investigate into reasonable accommodation is unimportant. 
See Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420 (quoting Willis v. Conopco, 
Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997)). Accordingly, the 
district court properly granted summary judgment as to 
Gaul's ADA claim. 
 
Having concluded that Gaul's proposed accommodation 
was unreasonable as a matter of law under the ADA, it 
follows that his NJLAD claim must also fail. See Ensslin v. 
Township of North Bergen, 275 N.J. Super. 352, 364, 646 
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A.2d 452, 458 (App. Div. 1994) (New Jersey courts 
considering reasonable accommodation under NJLAD look 
to case law interpreting federal law on same point) (citing 
Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 89 N.J. 483, 497 n.3, 446 
A.2d 486, 493 n.3 (1982)). It also follows that plaintiff's 
remaining state law claims (i.e., breach of contract, breach 
of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 
constructive discharge) must also fail because they too are 
based on defendant's alleged failure to provide reasonable 
accommodations. Accordingly, the district court properly 
granted summary judgment as to plaintiff's state law 
claims. 
 
IV. 
 
The February 21, 1997, order of the district court will be 
affirmed. 
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